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A. COMMUNITY AGREEMENTS AS AN INDICATOR OF THE ROLE OF THE EU IN THE
FIELD OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The role of the EU1 as an international actor in the field of foreign investment was
largely unnoticed until very recently, when the interrelationship between Community
and international investment law acquired renowned interest. Community law has been
used for challenging the Member States’ presence in the field of foreign investment,
questioning the validity and applicability of the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
between EU Member States and with third countries.2 In addition to posing restrictions
on Member States’ powers, the EU is also gradually perpetuating a more active role in
the field of foreign investment, asserting its own competence in the field of foreign
investment, which is for the first time explicitly recognized in the Lisbon Treaty.3
However, the interest of the EU in foreign investment is not a new phenomenon.
Acknowledging the importance of international regulation of foreign investment the EU
has gradually attempted to assert its own presence as an international actor in the field of
foreign investment regulation. In fact, the EU has incorporated provisions on foreign
investment in the Association Agreements that it has concluded with third countries
(henceforth and for the purposes of this article EC IIAs), highlighting the role of foreign
investment in EC external relations. Foreign investment provisions are found in
* PhD candidate (European University Institute), LL M (Cantab), M L E (Hannover). The author would like
to thank Professor Marise Cremona and Dr. Karl Sauvant for their valuable comments on previous drafts of this
article. The author may be contacted at angelos.dimopoulos@eui.eu.
1 In this article the term European Community (EC) will be used for identifying the legal person concluding
IIAs and the term European Union (EU) will be used more broadly, referring to broader EU policy objectives, the
Member States and their nationals.
2 The possible interactions between BITs and Community law have been indicated in a number of recent
disputes, such as the Eastern Sugar award and Cases C-205/06 Commission v. Austria and C-206/06 Commission v.
Sweden [2009] ECR 1-0000. For a discussion of these cases see M. Burgstaller, European Law and Investment Treaties,
26 Journal of International Arbitration 181 (2009); T. Eilmansberger, Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law,
46 Common Market Law Review 383 (2009); H. Wehland, Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration: Is
European Community Law an obstacle?, 58 International and Comparative Law Review 297 (2009).
3 Article 207 on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides explicitly that the Common
Commercial Policy covers foreign direct investment. See also below part III.A.
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agreements with countries aiming at future accession to the EU, such as the Stabilization
and Association Agreements (SAAs) with Balkan countries,4 in agreements with
neighbouring countries aiming at enhanced economic and political cooperation, such as
the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements,5
and in ‘pure’ economic and free trade agreements that the EC has concluded with other
countries, such as those with South Africa, Mexico and Chile and CARIFORUM States.
Thus, an examination of EC IIAs sheds light to the increasing importance that
foreign investment acquires in EC external relations, contributing to a better
understanding of the existing regulatory framework and indicating, to a certain degree,
the future orientation of the emerging EC foreign investment policy. Given the
diversity of the objectives of these agreements and the different approaches that they
adopt with regard to economic integration and association and the rapid evolution of
investment provisions through time, an analysis of the scope of all foreign investment
provisions found in these agreements would be rather lengthy. For the purposes of this
article, it would suffice to focus on the latest Economic and Partnership Agreement with
CARIFORUM States (hereinafter EPA),6 because it incorporates the most comprehensive
and extensive provisions on foreign investment, thus setting a model for future EU
agreements, and also because it was concluded with countries that do not have far-
reaching integration objectives, thus the investment provisions do not bear close
resemblance to the EC Treaty provisions that cover intra-EU investments.
B. SKETCHING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EC IIAS AND BITS
The basic characteristic that renders the examination of EC IIAs interesting is that
the legal framework on foreign investment promotion and regulation in EC IIAs
presents remarkable differences from BITs and other IIAs. Instead of focusing on
investment protection, EC IIAs link foreign investment regulation with market
integration and development principles, indicating that the EC promotes an alternative
regulatory framework on foreign investment. Such a comparison between EC IIAs and
BITs becomes highly relevant, if it is undertaken in light of the objectives that
international regulation of foreign investment pursues.
Indeed, the massive conclusion of BITs over the last 20 years, which amount today
to more than 2,600,7 has been routed in the belief of states that BITs contribute to their
THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE2
4 The EU has concluded Stability and Association agreements with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
5 The EU has concluded Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia and has recently concluded the negotiations with Syria and Partnership and Co-operation
Agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
6 Economic Partnership Agreement between the CARIFORUM States, of the one part, and the European
Community and its Member States, of the other Part, concluded on December 21st 2007, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/acp/pr220208_en.htm. The CARIFORUM States are a regional
grouping of 15 Caribbean countries, namely Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Gyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago.
7 UNCTAD, IIA Monitor No.2 2008, Recent developments in international investment agreements, available
at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20081_en.pdf (last visited 18th November 2009).
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development, advancing investment flows and providing benefits arising from foreign
investment activity.8 Recognizing the positive impact of foreign investment flows on
economic growth and development,9 most countries have been eager to develop a legal
framework regulating foreign investment so as to attract foreign investment and ensure
benefits arising from foreign investment activity.
Although BITs have been successful in offering foreign investors a significant tool
for protecting their investments, it is controversial whether and to what extent they
have managed to achieve the main goal that led most countries in concluding them,
namely contributing to the promotion of foreign investment and the advancement of
foreign investment flows.10 Focusing mainly on protection against expropriation, BITs
have been unsuccessful to address other, equally or even more important regulatory
determinants of foreign investment.11 For example, the majority of BITs do not seem to
take into account the emerging and evolving characteristics of foreign investment that
raise particular regulatory concerns, such as the shift in most investment activities
towards services.12 In addition to their ability to attract foreign investment, BITs have
been the subject of even greater scepticism regarding their role in maximizing the
benefits from foreign investment activity and contributing to the development of host
countries. Protection of foreign investment has given rise to challenges of national
measures implementing public policies,13 giving little space for environmental, public
health, human rights or other development concerns to be taken into consideration.14
THE EU AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 3
8 A. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties,
38 Virginia J Int’l L 640 (1998), at 680-684.
9 On the question of whether foreign investment contributes to development see: UNCTAD, Economic
Development in Africa, Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct Investment (New York; Geneva: United Nations
Publications, 2006); T. Moran, Does Foreign Investment promote development? (Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 2005); H. Kehal, Foreign Investment in Developing Countries (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004); A. Bende-Nabende, Globalisation, FDI, Regional Integration (Aldershot; Burlington: Ashgate,
2002); K. Sauvant & J. Weber (eds.) International Investment Agreements: Key Issues (New York; Geneva; United
Nations Publications, 2005) chapter 27.
10 The existence of controversial empirical evidence does not necessarily question the role of international
regulation as an important determinant of foreign investment flows. Without exaggerating the role of international
regulation, since other factors, such as the domestic institutional and economic environment or the existence of
natural resources and favorable market conditions, are important variables of foreign investment flows, the empirical
evidence rather questions the suitability of the provisions of IIAs to achieve the objectives of foreign investment
regulation to attract foreign investment and increase benefits from it. On the impact of IIAs on FDI flows see in
particular L. Sachs & K. Sauvant (eds.), The Impact of Bilateral Investment and Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign Direct
Investment Flows (New York: OUP, 2008); J. Salacuse & N. Sullivan, Do BITs really work: an evaluation of bilateral
investment treaties and their grand bargain, 46 Harvard Int’l L J 67 (2005); UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003
FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives, at 99-145; J. Tobin & S. Rose-Ackerman, Foreign
direct investment and the business environment in developing countries: The impact of bilateral investment treaties, Yale Law
School Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 293; E. Aisbett, Bilateral Investment
Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation, MPRA Paper No. 225, March 2007.
11 S. Griffith-Jones, Global Capital Flows (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), at 158-160, 171-175.
12 On the shift towards services and the regulatory concerns that it raises see: UNCTAD, World Investment Report
2004: The Shift Towards Services (New York; Geneva: United Nations Publications, 2004), at 147-180, 208-212.
13 For example Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 August 2000, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 6 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 168 (2001); Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, Decision on
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2005, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, 20 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 450 (2005); Azurix Corp. v.
Argentine Republic, Award, 14 July 2006, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12.
14 A. Cosbey et al., Investment and Sustainable Development: A guide to the Use and Potential of International
Investment Agreements (Winnipeg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2004), at 9-14; L. Peterson
& K. Gray, International Human Rights in Bilateral Investment Treaties and m Investment Treaty Arbitration (Winnipeg,
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2005), at 6.
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In light of these criticisms of BITs, this article sketches the differences of EC IIAs
from traditional BITs and examines whether and to what extent they offer a “better”
framework for international regulation of foreign investment in terms of addressing the
goals of attracting foreign investment and maximizing benefits from it. Its objective is to
determine the reasons behind and the goals of the legal framework on foreign investment
in EC IIAs and to assess whether the legal mechanisms that are established therein are
suitable and sufficient for achieving the envisaged objectives. In order to do so, the
content of the specific provisions dealing with foreign investment, viewed
comparatively, is discussed firstly, using the EPA as an example. Secondly, the reasons
justifying the different scope of EC IIAs are examined, looking into the competence and
policy reasons that explain the scope of EC IIAs. Afterwards, the goals that are pursued
by the EU in adopting the EPA are analyzed, highlighting the emphasis placed on
internationalization of foreign investment rules and the shift from protection to
liberalization and promotion provisions. Finally, the last part discusses whether the scope
and content of EC IIAs provisions respond effectively to the goals they set; it examines in
particular whether and to what extent these provisions fulfill the objective of economic
and social development, hence, offering a solution for the problems raised by BITs.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN THE EPA WITH
CARIFORUM STATES
Respecting the freedoms and limits imposed by primary Community rules and
reflecting contemporaneous political considerations on the scope and extent of legally
binding obligations, as will be discussed in part III, the EPA presents a unique model of
international regulation of foreign investment which departs from the traditional BIT
form. Drawing influences from the GATS provisions on commercial presence, the EPA
presents significant differentiations in comparison to BITs.
Starting with the definition of foreign investment, a first striking difference from
BITs is that the EPA distinguishes between foreign direct investment (FDI) and other forms
of investment, most importantly, portfolio investment. Unlike BITs which include a
broad, all embracing definition of investment, the EPA deals separately with FDI and
portfolio investment, providing a different set of rules for the establishment and the
treatment of foreign direct investment.15 Although this distinction may be justified with
regard to the admission of foreign investment, since the admission of direct investment
poses additional regulatory concerns in comparison to short-term investments,16 such
THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE4
15 Article 65 of the EPA contains the definition of an ‘Investor’ and ‘commercial presence’, indicating that the
following provisions relate only to foreign direct investment. In other EC IIAs portfolio investment is usually
considered under their capital movements provisions, but Article 123(1) of the EPA is clear that free movement of
capital provisions concern only movements related to direct investment, thus excluding portfolio investment from
the scope of the EPA.
16 Regulation of establishment deals with the way the activity of an investor will take place, considering
foreign equity ownership limitations, quantitative restrictions, administrative authorizations and restrictions on the
legal form of an investment, whereas portfolio investment does not raise such concerns. I. Gomez-Palacio &
P. Muchlinski, ‘Admission and Establishment’ in Muchlinski, Ortino & Schreuer (eds.) Oxford Handbook of
International Investment Law (Oxford; New York: OUP, 2008), at 230-232.
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differentiation is more difficult to comprehend with regard to the post-admission
treatment of foreign investment, where similar regulatory concerns exist.
This distinction between FDI and portfolio investment renders clear the importance
that admission of foreign investment plays in the EPA in comparison to BITs. Indeed,
most BITs, in particular EU Member States’ and South-South BITs, offer only partial
coverage of foreign investment regulation, leaving outside their scope issues pertaining
to the entry and operation of foreign investors, which remain under national regulatory
control.17 As a result, a first striking difference is that the EPA deals explicitly with the
admission of foreign investment, namely the degree of liberalization of capital
movements and the conditions for the establishment of foreign investors.18
Furthermore, the EPA differentiates from BITs that include provisions on admission of
investment, notably those by the US and Canada.19 Providing for liberalization of capital
movements relating to direct investments20 and granting market access and national
treatment to foreign investors,21 the EPA addresses entry and establishment of foreign
investment from a different perspective.22
In addition to listing the freedoms enjoyed by and the restrictions placed on foreign
investors wishing to establish themselves in the host country, the EPA includes also
provisions offering specific standards of treatment to foreign investors, both before and
after their establishment in the host country. Similar to the BIT model of offering
general, abstract standards of treatment to foreign investment, it provides for qualified
Most-Favoured-Nation and National Treatment of foreign investors in the regulated
sector at the post-establishment phase.23 However, a glance at the EPA provisions on
post-establishment treatment of foreign investment reveals two significant differences
from traditional BITs.
Firstly, the EPA presents a strong linkage between establishment and post-
establishment treatment of foreign investment. Contrary to Member States BITs, which
provide standards of treatment of foreign investors at the post-establishment phase
without granting any rights for admission and establishment of FDI, the EPA seems to
condition the regulation of post-establishment treatment on the existence of provisions
THE EU AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 5
17 R. Dolzer & C. Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford; New York: OUP, 2008), at 107;
Gomez-Palacio & Muchlinski, supra note 16, at 240-242.
18 Establishment concerns the setting up and management of a primary or a dependent undertaking in the host
state. On the scope and content of establishment regulation in general see UNCTAD, Admission and Establishment
(New York; Geneva: UN Publications, 1999), at 1-4; J. Salacuse, ‘Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment:
the Search for a Grand Bargain’ in Horn (ed.) Arbitrating foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 2004), at 73.
19 On the scope of BITs including liberalizing provisions see: T. Pollan, Legal Framework for the Admission of
FDI (Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2006), at 77-85.
20 Articles 123 and 124 of the EPA.
21 Articles 67, 69 and Annex 4 of the EPA.
22 See below part IV.B. For a detailed description of the content of EPA provisions see: P. Sauve & N. Ward,
‘Services and Investment in the EC-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement Innovation in Rule
Design and Implications for Africa’ ECIPE (2009), at 11-16, 36-44 available at http://www.ecipe.org/the-ec-
cariform-economic-partnership-agreement-assessing-the-outcome-on-services-and-investment/PDF (last visited
18th November 2009).
23 Articles 68 and 70 of the EPA.
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on establishment, since post-establishment treatment standards are offered only to the
extent that admission of foreign investment is allowed. Nevertheless, this does not
necessarily mean that the scope of post-establishment treatment of foreign direct
investment is identical to the scope of establishment provisions. Although the EPA
makes use of the same non-discrimination standards of treatment for the establishment
and post-establishment treatment of FDI, it provides different standards of treatment at
each stage for the different sectors of foreign investment.
Secondly, the EPA provides for different standards of treatment of foreign
investment in comparison to BITs. Using language based on the non-discrimination
principle, the EPA departs from traditional BIT language which formally vests foreign
investors with other standards as well. Despite the lack of identical wording in BITs, a
common standard provided in the vast majority of BITs is Fair and Equitable Treatment,
while many agreements provide additional standards, such as Full Protection and
Security and protection against arbitrary and discriminatory measures.24 This lack of
such standards of treatment, and most importantly of Fair and Equitable Treatment in
EU IIAs appears to be limiting the scope of treatment offered to foreign investors
thereunder.
However, the EPA contains innovative provisions concerning specific aspects
relating to the post-establishment operation of foreign investors. Among them, the
provisions on the employment of foreign key personnel are of particular importance,25
as they cover an important aspect of post-admission operation of foreign investment in
a detailed manner that is not found under most BITs.26 Furthermore, the EPA includes a
number of innovative provisions on investors’ behavior, maintenance of standards as
well as on general exceptions from the application of the investment rules. Building
upon current BITs provisions that concern the relation between foreign investment and
labour or environmental standards,27 Articles 72 and 73 of the EPA on investors’
behaviour and maintenance of standards oblige the parties to take all appropriate
measures to ensure that foreign investment activity conforms to a number of standards.
Addressing public policy considerations, Articles 224 and 225 enable host states to adopt
under certain conditions measures pursuing specific public policy objectives that would
otherwise be considered to infringe the investment provisions of the agreement.28
Contrary to BITs, the EPA does not deal with protection of foreign investment
against expropriation. The ambiguity over the scope of EC competence to regulate the
conditions for expropriation of foreign investment, as well as the lack of political will to
incorporate the traditional, core aspect of international regulation of foreign investment
THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE6
24 For an enumeration of the different standards of treatment provided in BITs see Dolzer & Schreuer, supra
note 17, Chapter 7.
25 Articles 80-84 of the EPA.
26 For example the US Model BIT of 2004 contains a provision prohibiting only national measures
determining the nationality of natural persons having managerial positions.
27 For example Articles 12 and 13 of the US Model BIT.
28 For an analysis of these provisions see below part IV.C.
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in EC IIAs, which would bring about significant legal and political effects on Member
States’ BIT and foreign investment policy in general, hindered the creation of a complete
regulatory framework on foreign investment in EC IIAs. Respecting and recognizing
the BITs that EU Member States have concluded with CARIFORUM countries, the EPA
stops short of including provisions relating to expropriation, thus avoiding any potential
conflict with them.29
Recognizing the prominent role of dispute settlement in foreign investment
regulation, the EPA provides for the settlement of disputes arising out of the application
of its foreign investment provisions. However, the dispute settlement mechanisms
provided depart significantly from the well established model of investor-state
arbitration that has become an essential characteristic of BITs and IIAs in general.
Drawing on the WTO agreement, the EPA establishes only one dispute settlement
mechanism applying to all trade and trade-related matters, including foreign investment,
thus applying all elements of interstate dispute settlement to investment disputes.30 As a
result, private individuals are prevented from initiating or participating in a dispute.
They are given only the possibility of submitting amicus curiae briefs,31 thus needing to
convince their home states to espouse their claim and initiate interstate settlement
proceedings. Besides, private investors cannot benefit directly from the remedies
provided by the agreement, which consist of the withdrawal of inconsistent
commitments, compensation and retaliation in situations similar to those described in
the WTO DSU. Private investors’ damages are not taken into account nor does
compensation present a possible remedy, thus diminishing the effectiveness of
investment dispute settlement.
Last but not least, the EPA recognizes the significance of foreign investment
promotion and establishes a framework for cooperation, in particular by integrating
investment promotion32 in development co-operation. Investment promotion is an
important field of development cooperation, belonging to the general institutional
framework that determines development cooperation. In addition to the general
development cooperation framework, the EPA regards investment promotion as a
specific field of cooperation, where support for technical assistance, training and
capacity building is provided in order to establish mechanisms for promotion of
THE EU AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 7
29 Article 71 of the EPA provides that “Nothing in this Title shall be taken to limit the rights of investors of the Parties
to benefit from any more favourable treatment provided for in any existing or future international agreement relating to investment
to which a Member State of the European Community and a Signatory CARIFORUM State are Parties”.
30 For an overview of the dispute settlement provisions included in EC IIAs and their differences from BITs
see I.G. Bercero, ‘Dispute Settlement in European Union Free Trade Agreements: Lesson Learned?’ in L. Bartels
& F. Ortino (eds). Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO System (Oxford; New York: OUP, 2006), at 389 ff;
E.R. Robles, Political & Quasi-Adjudicative Dispute Settlement Models m European Union Free Trade Agreements, WTO
Economic and Research Statistics Division, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2006-09, (2006).
31 It is noteworthy that Article 217 of the EPA explicitly secures the right for private individuals to submit
amicus curiae.
32 The term ‘investment promotion’ is used in this article in a narrow sense, relating only to the measures that
affect the institutional capacity and willingness of host states to promote foreign investment and not to all measures
that create favourable determinants for foreign investment, as the latter definition would include liberalizing and
protection measures as well.
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investment and enhance the capacities of investment promotion agencies in
CARIFORUM States.33 The inclusion of provisions on investment promotion presents an
important innovation in comparison to most BITs; the latter include mainly ‘best efforts’
provisions, focusing on transparency of national laws and regulations, and rarely provide
for general or specific investment promotion measures and policy frameworks that
home and host states should adopt in order to promote foreign investment flows.34
Comparing the EPA with existing BITs and in particular those concluded by EU
Member States, one can easily detect a shift in regulatory priorities. The EPA excludes
from its scope investor-state arbitration and protection of foreign investment against
expropriation, which have been the core elements of foreign investment regulation in
most investment agreements. It focuses mainly on admission and treatment of foreign
investment, using largely the GATS as a model for regulation of foreign investment.
Indeed, the GATS has exerted significant influence on the structure, scope and content
of the foreign investment provisions under the EPA, covering the same aspects of foreign
investment regulation and providing for similar dispute settlement mechanisms.
However, perceiving the EPA as a mere duplication of the GATS does injustice to it. The
EPA has sufficient original elements that can justify its characterization as an innovative
model for international regulation of foreign investment. Although it is based on the
GATS, its scope is extended to cover investment beyond services sectors, it distinguishes
between the different modes for supply of services in terms of structure and it includes
original provisions, such as those on investors’ behavior and maintenance of standards,
as well as detailed provisions on issues that are deemed of greater importance, such as
movement of investment related natural persons.
III. REASONS FOR INCLUDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN EC IIAS AND THE GOALS
PURSUED BY THE EU
In order to explain the different stance adopted by the EU with regard to
international regulation of foreign investment, it is necessary to explore initially the
reasons that led the EU to expand and to narrow at the same time the scope of
international foreign investment regulation in its IIAs. After examining the rationales
underlying the scope of foreign investment provisions in EC IIAs, one has to consider
the reasons for the adoption of the specific content of foreign investment provisions.
In that respect, the specific policy goals pursued by the EU have to be identified
and analyzed.
THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE8
33 Article 121. See also D. teVelde and S. Bilal, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in the Cotonou Agreement:
Building on Private Sector Initiatives’ in Babarinde & Faber (eds.) The European Union and Developing Countries The
Cotonou Agreement (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), at 211-214.
34 UNCTAD, Investment Promotion Provisions in International Investment Agreements (New York; Geneva: UN
Publications, 2008), at 13-14.
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A. EXPLAINING THE REASONS FOR INCLUDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN EC IIAS
Understanding the existence and scope of foreign investment provisions in EC IIAs
requires looking firstly at the competence that the EC has in the field of foreign
investment. Bearing in mind that the EC is a supranational organization with limited,
attributable powers,35 the scope of foreign investment provisions in EC IIAs depends
primarily on the existence and exercise of EC competence in the field of foreign
investment. As a result, the different scope of foreign investment provisions in EC IIAs
is a result of the continuously evolving nature of EC competence and its effort to
“substitute” its Member States in international foreign investment relations.
The EC Treaty (TEC) does not offer a specific legal basis enabling the EC to take
external action in the field of foreign investment. Unlike trade, where the EC enjoys
exclusive competence, its competence on foreign investment was limited36 and still
remains controversial.37 The lack of an explicit legal basis on foreign investment has
been the result of the reluctance of Member States to hand over to the EC any
competence over foreign investment matters. Member States have consistently
considered that international foreign investment regulation lies under their exclusive
competence and have concluded massively BITs with third countries.
Nevertheless, the EC Treaty includes a number of provisions that enable the EC
to take action and conclude international agreements with third countries in the field of
foreign investment. The EC Treaty makes an explicit reference to foreign investment
in Article 56 TEC on capital movements. However the scope of this provision is
arguably limited only to the actual transfer of assets destined to be used for the
establishment of an investor and not to the conditions of initial establishment as such.38
Establishment of foreign investors is covered partially by Article 133 TEC on the
Common Commercial Policy, since trade in services covers the commercial presence of
foreign investors, while the Treaty provisions on establishment confer implied powers
on the Community with regard to the initial establishment of foreign investors in all
economic sectors.39 Similar concerns exist also with regard to the post-establishment
THE EU AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT 9
35 According to the principle of attribution, which is enunciated in Article 5 TEC, the EC shall act only within
the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaty to attain the objectives set out
therein.
36 W. Shan, Towards a Common European Community Policy on Investment Issues, 2 JWIT 603 (2001); L. Mola,
Which Role for the EU in the Development of International Investment Law?, Society of International Economic Law,
Working Paper 26/08 (2008).
37 For an analysis of EU competence over foreign investment under the current Treaty, the Constitutional
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty see: J. Ceyssens, Towards a Common Foreign Investment Policy? – Foreign Investment in
the European Constitution, 32 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 259 (2005); J. Karl, The Competence for Foreign
Direct Investment, 4 JWIT 414 (2003). On the author’s perception of the scope of Community competence over
foreign investment see A. Dimopoulos, The Common Commercial Policy after Lisbon: Establishing parallelism between
internal and external economic policy?, 4 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 101 (2008).
38 For an analysis of the relevance of Article 56 TEC for foreign investment regulation see indicatively R Torrent,
Derecho comunitario e Inversiones extranjeras directas: Libre circulacion de los capitales vs. Regulacion no discriminatoria del
establecimiento. De la golden share a los nuevos Open Skies, 22 Revista Espanola de derecho europeo 291 (2007).
39 In accordance with the doctrine of implied powers, the existence of EC implied powers in the field of
foreign investment requires that regulation of the activity of third country nationals in the EU as well as of EU
nationals in third countries is necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the internal market. In that regard,
the competence to establish a uniform regulatory framework on the establishment of EU nationals in the EU
(footnote continued on next page)
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treatment of foreign investors, where again the foundations of EC competence are
rather obscure. Furthermore, the open-ended scope of the provisions on harmonization
in the internal market could arguably enable the EC to regulate protection of foreign
investment from expropriation, and the chapter on development cooperation adds
another legal basis that could be used for inserting investment promotion provisions in
EC IIAs.40
Given this patchwork of dispersed and limited competences, the EC has attempted
to formulate its own, distinctive foreign investment policy, ‘encroaching’ gradually on
Member States powers in the field. Using the legal tools which are available in the EC
Treaty, the EC has formulated a legal framework for foreign investment, focusing
initially in areas that were not covered by Member States’ international agreements. In
order to avoid the opposition of Member States, the EC considered its foreign
investment policy complementary to that of the Member States, inserting provisions on
issues such as capital movements and investment promotion as a field of development
cooperation.41 The EC has gradually expanded its foreign investment policy in other
areas of foreign investment regulation, in particular concerning entry and operation of
foreign investment. Given that EC competence in these fields is shared, the exercise of
its competence plays an additional role, as it pre-empts Member States from taking any
further action, thus rendering these aspects of foreign investment regulation under
exclusive EC competence.42 This growing internal power struggle between the EC and
its Member States has been made explicit in practice, as the EC has challenged the
conformity of Member States’ BITs with EC law, thus questioning the scope and
exercise of Member States’ powers in the field.43
Apart from the internal struggle and the historical evolution of EC IIAs, another
reason for the broad and different scope of foreign investment provisions in EC IIAs has
been their incorporation in agreements serving broader external relations goals. Foreign
THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE10
encompasses also the competence over the establishment of third country nationals, because otherwise divergent
laws in the Member States setting different conditions for third country nationals could impede the effectiveness of
the uniform provisions. With regard to the establishment of EU nationals in third countries, implied Community
competence can be derived from the need to secure equal and non-discriminatory treatment of EU nationals in
third countries via the conclusion of international agreements, as the latter has been recognized by the Court in the
Open Skies cases (indicatively Case C-467/98 Commission v. Denmark [2002] ECR I-9519).
40 For an overview of the possible legal bases enabling the EC to take action in the field of foreign investment
see Dimopoulos, supra note 37, at 109-113.
41 O. Babarinde & G. Faber, From Lomé to Cotonou: Business as usual? 9 EFA Review 27 (2004), at 33-35.
42 EC competence in the field of the internal market as well as in the field of the Common Commercial Policy
with regard to trade in services is shared with the Member States [M. Cremona, A Policy of BITs and Pieces? The
Common Commercial Policy after Nice, 4 Cambridge Yearbook of European Law Studies 61 (2001), at 84]. It is
rendered exclusive only after the EC has adopted common rules in the field and exclusivity is necessary to avoid
any effect on the common rules which may result from autonomous action taken by the Member States (AETR-
type exclusivity). For an analysis of AETR-type exclusivity see P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Oxford;
Portland: Hart, 2006), at 84-88.
43 In addition to the infringement proceedings that the EC has initiated against against Austria, Sweden and
Finland for having concluded BITs that are incompatible with the EC Treaty (supra note 1), another example
indicating the EC’s interest in the field presents the Commission’s insistence on the renegotiation of the BITs
between the Member States that acceded in the EU in 2004 and the US. See Koutrakos, supra note 42, at 321-325;
A. Radu, Foreign Investors in the EU – Which “Best Treatment”? Interactions Between Bilateral Investment treaties and EU
Law’, 14 European Law Journal 237 (2008).
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investment provisions are incorporated in agreements that have divergent objectives and
aim at different levels of political, economic and social integration. As the EC has opted
for broader association agreements dealing with a variety of external policy issues,
regulation of foreign investment is only part of the broader framework, being influenced
by the general objectives pursued. The EPA constitutes a prominent example, as it has
been negotiated and concluded in the framework of the Cotonou Agreement,44 which
has been the last in a series of international agreements between the EC and African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries. Considering the orientation of the EC external policy
with regard to developing countries and its emphasis on their development and
integration in the world economy,45 it is understandable that the EPA places emphasis
on the development aspects of foreign investment regulation.
In addition, the promotion of an innovative system of rules on foreign investment
in EC IIAs is linked with the EC external policy objective to establish itself as an
important actor in international economic relations. The scope of the foreign
investment provisions found in EC IIAs illustrates the attempt of the EC to exert its own
model of international economic regulation to its partners. By adopting a hub-and-
spoke system, the EU takes advantage of its size and economic power in order to
‘impose’ on its partners international rules on foreign investment and gradually improve
its international position, affecting future bilateral and multilateral agreements on
foreign investment.46 Considering the reluctance and resistance of states, and in
particular developing countries, to assume further international obligations on foreign
investment, the EU promotes a development-friendly legal framework, which arguably
takes into account both the economic interests of capital exporting countries and the
needs for development of capital importing countries.
B. THE OBJECTIVES PURSUED BY THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROVISIONS OF THE
EPA WITH CARIFORUM STATES
The different content of the EPA can be better explained, if it is viewed in the
context of the broader policy goals pursued by the EC. The establishment of
international rules in areas of foreign investment regulation, which were traditionally
considered to be under national control, indicates firstly that the EC promotes the
internationalization of foreign investment rules. More importantly, the special weight
attributed to promotion and entry of foreign investment and the elaborate system of
rules established suggests that EC foreign investment policy is primarily oriented
towards liberalization and development norms.
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44 Partnership Agreement between the Members of the ACP Group of he one part, and the European
Communities and its Member States of the other part, Cotonou, Benin 23.6.2000, OJ [2000] L317/3.
45 On EU external development policy see Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives of the
Governments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission
on European Union Development Policy, “The European Consensus”, OJ C46/1, Brussels 22.11.2005; K. Arts,
ACP-EU relations in a new era: The Cotonou Agreement, 40 Common Market Law Review 95 (2003).
46 M. Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (London: Routledge, 2005), at 385-387.
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Beginning with the internationalization of foreign investment rules on admission
and operation of foreign investment, EC IIAs take into account the realities of the global
economy, which exists beyond national borders. The internationalization of foreign
investment rules is considered as an effective means for addressing the problems and the
concerns that foreign investment activity raises. More specifically, the establishment of
international rules serves primarily the need of foreign investors and capital exporting
countries for legal certainty and efficient and transparent regulation. The adoption of
substantive international rules brings about standardization of the regulatory framework,
enhancing its simplicity and, consequently, strengthening the confidence of foreign
investors.47 In addition, the establishment of a framework clarifying the relevant national
rules enhances the transparency of the national system and adds to its efficient
application by national administrations. Furthermore, the internationalization of foreign
investment rules gives the opportunity to national policy makers in host countries to
review and modernize their national legislation, in particular in developing countries
lacking the required expertise, which can benefit from the internationalization of
foreign investment rules.
Moreover, internationalization of rules on admission and treatment of foreign
investment is in many circumstances an optimal way for balancing the divergent
interests of capital importing, capital exporting countries and foreign investors. They
give the opportunity to raise the concerns of all relevant actors and to achieve a balance
between promotion and protection of foreign investment, thus avoiding the need to
resort to unilateral measures in order to support their respective interests.48 The EPA
illustrates the attempt to ensure a balance of interests: for example it promotes the
interests of foreign investors by offering them market access and other benefits, it enables
capital exporting countries to further their economic development by providing for
repatriation of profits and it incorporates the concerns of capital importing countries that
their public policy objectives are not obstructed, so that foreign investment activity is
beneficial for them.
Turning now to the shift of emphasis from investment protection to promotion
and liberalization, it appears that the EC aims in its international agreements to address
the economic interests of foreign investors, home and host countries. With regard to the
interests of foreign investors, EC IIAs and the EPA in particular recognize the ever-
growing importance of market access as a major regulatory determinant of investment
decisions.49 Liberalizing the conditions for entry of foreign investment and regulating
important aspects of its operation, such as the employment of key personnel, the EPA
aims to increase the attractiveness of countries as investment locations, thus shaping
foreign investors’ preferences.
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48 B. Hoekman & R. Newfarmer, Preferential Trade Agreements, Investment Disciplines and Investment Flows,
5 Journal of World Trade 949 (2005), at 949-950.
49 S. Szepesi, Comparing EU Free Trade Agreements: Investment, InBrief 6D of European Centre for
Development Policy Management, available at www.ecdpm.org (last visited 18th November 2009).
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The shift towards liberalization reflects also the interests of states to provide access
to their nationals to third country markets and to increase competition in their domestic
markets. The opening of third country markets to EU nationals has been explicitly
considered a fundamental objective of EU external commercial policy, reflecting the
belief that access to third countries’ markets will enhance the global competitiveness of
European companies, enabling them to survive and achieve greater profits in an
increasingly open and competitive global economic environment.50 Furthermore, the
adoption of an open market access regime signifies the end of protectionism of national
entrepreneurs, which distorts competition, allowing only for exceptions in sensitive
sectors, where state intervention is considered necessary for protecting security or other
strategic interests.51
In addition, the achievement of healthy competition conditions is also pursued
through the establishment of minimum standards. They latter serve a double role, as
they also enable host countries to develop and improve their domestic level of labor,
environmental and health protection. Although, the adoption of such standards may be
burdensome for developing host countries, they still enjoy the flexibility to adjust their
regulatory regime according to their needs. Bearing in mind that host countries can
effectively pursue public policies without infringing the provisions of EPA using the
exception mechanism, this leaves great leverage to host countries to construe and
implement national policies beneficial for their development.
Lastly, the inclusion in EC IIAs, and in the EPA in particular, of investment
promotion in the framework of development cooperation exemplifies the EU
commitment towards contributing to the development of developing countries,
enabling the latter to build up the institutional capacity to attract and increase benefits
from foreign investment activity. The EPA appears to fit perfectly to the development
orientation of EU external economic policy towards developing countries, reaffirming
the adherence to the principles of sustainable development in practice.52 From the
perspective of developing countries, the EPA puts in an international legally binding
framework the means and objectives of EU development aid, which by targeting at
foreign investment promotion improves their potential to benefit from foreign
investment.
To sum up, the inclusion of foreign investment provisions in EC IIAs serves a
plurality of goals, divergent in their nature and orientation. While the achievement of
political goals aiming at increasing EU presence in the field of foreign investment
regulation both internally and externally should not be underestimated, the scope and
content of EC IIAs is determined by their specific goals as well. EC IIAs consider the
adoption of international rules as a better means of regulation than national legislation,
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51 Ibid., at para. 3. l (ii).
52 R. Williams, Community Development Cooperation Law, Sustainable Development, and the Convention on Europe
– From Dislocation to Consistency? 4 Oxford Yearbook of European Environmental Law 303 (2005).
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while they place emphasis on liberalization and development. Although this shift in
regulatory priorities is not a unique characteristic of EC IIAs, they are distinguished from
other IIAs: by viewing these objectives through the prism of the broader EC external
relations goals, EC IIAs recognize the challenges from the interaction and attempt to
balance the potentially conflicting goals of liberalization and sustainable development.
Their aim to increase foreign investment activity and to secure that such activity will be
beneficial for all relevant actors suggests that the EC intends to assume a pioneer role in
the formation of innovative international investment norms rather than merely
following the trends set by other IIAs.
IV. DO EC IIAS ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES?
Having established that EC IIAs aim at increasing foreign investment flows and
ensuring benefits from foreign investment activity for host countries, we have to
examine whether their provisions are capable and sufficient to achieve these goals,
addressing the criticisms raised against the majority of BITs. Focusing on the needs and
concerns of developing countries and using the EPA as an example, this part looks mainly
at how the legal framework on foreign investment incorporates development
considerations in international foreign investment regulation. In that respect, the effects
of the general development objectives and principles of the EPA on foreign investment
are explored initially, followed by an analysis of the development orientation of the
substantive provisions liberalizing foreign investment. Afterwards, the provisions
requiring and enabling host states to adopt public policy measures are scrutinized and,
finally, the suitability and effectiveness of the rules on investment promotion are
considered.
A. THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EPA
Contribution to the sustainable economic, social and environmental development
of CARIFORUM States is a principal objective of the EPA as well as of the Cotonou
Agreement, which the EPA implements. It is noteworthy that the EPA stresses the role
of sustainable development as an objective “to be applied and integrated at every level of their
economic partnership”, which is also reiterated as the main objective of the chapter on
foreign investment.53 The recognition of sustainable development as an objective of the
EPA has important implications for its investment regime. As the objectives of
international treaties establish a relevant context for the interpretation of the other
provisions of the treaty,54 it is arguable that sustainable development principles influence
the application and interpretation of foreign investment norms. As a result, the EPA
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54 Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) states that “[a] treaty shall be
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context and in the light of its object and purpose”.
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requires that regulation of foreign investment and in particular its liberalizing provisions
contribute to the sustainable development of CARIFORUM States.
In addition to sustainable development, the EPA introduces human rights,
democracy and good governance as its basic principles and as an essential element of the
agreement.55 This provision establishes a strict obligation to respect human rights56 and it
is complemented by a non-execution clause, which allows parties to take appropriate
unilateral measures, if the other party fails to fulfill its human rights, democracy and good
governance obligations.57 As a result, the preliminary conclusion can be drawn that
foreign investment activity pursued under the EPA shall respect human rights, democracy
and good governance, as otherwise the host state can be sanctioned for not complying
with its human rights obligations. Furthermore, the threat of suspension of favorable
provisions can also act preventively; it discourages developing countries from lowering
or waiving their human rights obligations in order to encourage foreign investment and
it deters EU investors from “violating” human rights in the course of their activities in
the host country, as the suspension of trade and investment provisions would result in the
loss of the preferential treatment upon which their establishment was based.
Nevertheless, these provisions do not seem suitable to address effectively the
development concerns that liberalizing foreign investment regulation raises. With regard
to the objective of sustainable development, it is unclear whether it can be used in
practice for guaranteeing the development orientation of foreign investment. Given that
the development effects of foreign investment activity cannot be practically judged in
abstracto and a priori, excluding foreign investors from the beneficial scope of foreign
investment provisions, the objective of sustainable development obtains an important
role only ex post facto, in cases where the actual impact of foreign investment activity on
development is questioned under dispute settlement proceedings. But even in such cases,
the contested and vague nature and normative content of sustainable development may
discourage dispute settlement bodies from using this principle as an interpretative tool.58
Similar concerns arise also with regard to human rights conditionality, which is
more of a political mechanism used by the EU to “sanction” third countries for severe
violations of human rights and not a legal instrument allowing for an automatic
response to specific human rights violations resulting from foreign investment
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55 Article 2 provides that the EPA “is based on the Fundamental Principles as well as the Essential and
Fundamental Elements of the Cotonou Agreement, as set out in Articles 2 and 9, respectively, of the Cotonou
Agreement”, thus incorporating these provisions in its text.
56 For an analysis of the obligations established by essential elements clauses see L. Bartels, Human Rights
Conditionality in the EU’s International Agreements (New York: OUP, 2005), at 93-106; E. Fierro, The EU’s Approach
to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (The Hague; London: Martinus Nijhoff, 2003), at 213.
57 For an analysis of the suspension mechanism under human rights clauses see: A. Rosas, ‘Human Rights in
the External Trade Policy of the European Union’ in World Trade and the Protection of Human Rights. Human Rights
in Face of Global Economic Challenges, Publications de l’Institut International des Droits de l’Homme (2001), at 193;
M. Cremona, ‘Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC’s Trade Agreements’ in N. Emiliou and
D. O’Keefe (eds.) The European Union and World Trade Law (Chichester; New York: Wiley, 1996), at 62.
58 On the clarity of the normative content of sustainable development in international and EU law see M-C.
Cordonier-Segger & A. Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices and Prospects (Oxford; New York:
OUP, 2004) chapter 3; Williams, supra note 52.
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activity.59 The unsuitability of the suspension mechanism for addressing development
concerns of investment activity is also illustrated by the fact that the investment activity
that could raise human rights concerns is based on the provisions of the EPA, the
inclusion of which the EU has strongly supported and insisted on. Thus, the imposition
of sanctions would condemn a developing country for actions of foreign investors,
instead of contributing to the amelioration of human rights, democracy and
governance conditions in the host state.
B. THE DEVELOPMENT ORIENTATION OF LIBERALIZING PROVISIONS
The development needs and concerns of host states are better incorporated in the
substantive provisions concerning entry and operation of foreign investment. Starting
with the provisions on capital movements, the EPA provides for complete liberalization
of capital movements related to foreign direct investment, thus reflecting the belief that
the free movement of capital is a prerequisite for an increase of foreign investment
flows and, consequently, economic growth. Besides, it allows for the adoption of
safeguard measures limiting capital movements in order for economic and monetary
goals to be served under exceptional circumstances. Even though this exception
recognizes specific public interests that might result in a legitimate restriction of capital
movements, it does not allow restrictions on outward investment from developing
countries. This approach is in contrast with prior EC IIAs that enabled EU
counterparties to maintain restrictions on outward investment, which were considered
necessary for boosting the local economy of developing countries by stimulating
domestic investments and avoiding the negative for their development consequences
arising from capital exports.60 However, the EPA endorses a liberal approach towards
outward investment, considering that liberalization can result in benefits for
developing countries similar to those that developed countries enjoy. Given that the
number of globally competitive firms from developing countries is constantly
increasing, it can be in the interest of developing countries to allow them to invest
abroad, resulting in positive externalities for the home state.61
The development dimension of liberalizing provisions is better illustrated in the
chapter dealing with entry and treatment of foreign direct investment. In contrast with BITs
regulating entry of foreign investment, the EPA follows the example of the GATS, requiring
that the parties make market access and national treatment commitments, determining
themselves the sectors and the forms of entry and operation of foreign investment that are
liberalized. As a result, the EPA adopts a “positive list” approach to liberalization and aims
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61 For an analysis of the policy concerns on outward investment from developing countries see T. Moran,
‘What policies should developing country governments adopt toward outward FDI? Lessons from the experience
of developed countries’, in Sauvant, Mendoza &Ince (eds.) The Rise of TNCs from Emerging Markets: Threat or
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at the gradual liberalization of investment rules, thus enabling developing countries to set
their priorities and promote their development policies.62 Of course, this intermediate
position is subject to criticisms, as it could be argued that the EPA creates an inflexible liberal
regime, which does not take into account the changing priorities of developing countries,63
or that it encourages protectionism in sectors where liberalization can bring positive effects.
Despite these criticisms, the EPA appears to adopt a balanced approach towards
liberalization, as it provides an institutional framework for addressing such policy concerns,
which can eventually lead to informed changes in the list of each party’s commitments. Part
V of the EPA includes institutional provisions establishing a number of specific institutions
which are assigned with the task, among others, to assess the development impact of
liberalizing foreign investment commitments.64
The development orientation of the liberalizing provisions of the EPA is also
strengthened by the fact that it does not include a general prohibition on performance
requirements, but includes them into its positive list scheme with regard to entry and
treatment of foreign investment. Recognizing that host countries may acquire
significant benefits from the imposition of trade, competition and other performance
requirements,65 the EPA enables host states to make qualified market access and national
treatment commitments in specific sectors, thus being able to target foreign investment
activities that can contribute to their economic development.
At this point it should be mentioned that the development effect of foreign
investment liberalization is maximized as a result of the regional trade integration that
the EPA simultaneously pursues. The EPA sets the foundation for the achievement of
regional integration among the CARIFORUM States, which is considered as “a mechanism
for enabling these States to achieve greater economic opportunities, enhanced political stability and
to foster their effective integration into the world economy”66 As a result, the creation of larger
markets will provide great business opportunities and generate more foreign investment,
addressing an important economic determinant of market-seeking foreign investors.
Even though regional integration may initially lead to winners and losers within a region
due to inter-and intra-regional capital flows, thus depriving certain countries from
foreign and domestic capital,67 it is expected that any losses suffered by certain countries
will be only short term, as financial and technical aid can help them transform their
economy into a competitive economy of scales.68
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64 The CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee is assigned with the task to monitor and assess
the implementation of the agreement on sustainable development (Article 230.3.(a)), assisting the Joint
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agreement.
65 On the benefits that performance requirements may have on host state development see UNCTAD, FDI and
Performance Requirements: New Evidence from Selected Countries (New York; Geneva: UN Publications, 2003).
66 Article 4 of the EPA.
67 G. Faber, ‘Economic Partnership Agreements and Regional Integration’ in Babarinde & Faber (eds.), The
European Union and Developing Countries The Cotonou Agreement (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2005), at 92-94.
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Although the EPA establishes a legal framework on liberalization that allows for
development concerns to be taken into consideration, its success depends ultimately on
the political choices determining the level of commitments of each country and their
implementation.69
C. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the promotion of market openness and competitiveness, the EPA
takes cognizance of the negative effects that liberalization may bring about and aim to
maximize the benefits from investment inflows and mitigate its negative effects.
Ascribing to the goals of social justice and cohesion and the protection of consumers’
economic interests, the EPA incorporates exceptions and limitations to liberalization that
serve public policy interests. It is worth pointing out that the public policy goals served
by the investment provisions of the EPA do not only aim to “shield” the European
internal market and EU nationals, but they also have a strong development dimension,
contributing equally, if not more, to the protection of public interests in third countries,
which can be threatened from the use of the liberalizing provisions by European
investors in order to enter and operate in their market.
The emphasis placed on the development dimension of foreign investment
provisions is highlighted by the introduction of the provisions on investors’ behavior and
maintenance of standards. Considering firstly the provision on investors’ behavior, the
wording of Article 72 of the EPA leaves little doubt that it establishes minimum labour
and environmental standards. Not only does it recognize the right of the parties to pursue
policies that ensure these standards, but it also imposes an obligation on them to take the
appropriate and necessary measures. By linking minimum labour and environmental
standards to international law instruments binding on the Parties, it allows for
environmental and labour law considerations to be taken into account when foreign
investors’ rights and obligations are determined. As a result, it could be argued that the
EPA takes a step further than most IIAs by incorporating in a legally binding instrument
certain principles of corporate social responsibility that until now were adopted by
investors on a voluntary basis.70 Without imposing direct obligations on private
individuals, which would be controversial under public international law,71 the EPA text
is carefully drafted so that it introduces basic limits on foreign investment activity.
Moreover, the provision on maintenance of standards requires that the Parties do
not encourage foreign investment by lowering domestic standards. Even though similar
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provisions are found in other IIAs, such as Article 1114 NAFTA and Articles 12 and 13
of the US Model BIT, the EPA presents significant innovations, adopting a much
stronger wording, as it does not provide an appeal to the Parties’ “best efforts”, but
obliges them to avoid lowering their national standards. Besides, the EPA broadens the
scope of public policy concerns that are linked with foreign investment, including next
to environmental and labour standards social, health and cultural concerns.
In addition to the respect for national and international standards, the EPA includes
another mechanism enabling host countries to raise their development concerns and
pursue public policies in conformity with their foreign investment commitments. The
EPA provides in Article 224 a general exception from the application of the investment
provisions, allowing the Parties to adopt proportionate and non-discriminatory
measures that are necessary to protect and secure public morals, the public order,
human, animal or plant life or health, exhaustible natural resources national cultural
treasures and other public policy objectives. Adopting a similar wording to Article XX
GATT and Article XV GATS, the EPA is among the few IIAs that extend the scope of such
exception to investment provisions, thus allowing the Parties to invoke its application
for derogating from liberalization rules.72
Despite the innovative content of these provisions, it is arguable that they do not
fully address the development concerns of CARIFORUM States. The EPA does not
include the proper mechanisms for ensuring that the civil society can effectively raise
development concerns, which has to rely on home or host state action. A manifest
example of the incomplete system of the EPA is that if the provisions on investors’
behaviour and maintenance of standards are breached, the persons that are directly
affected are not provided with any means for demanding the enforcement of these
provisions, as such violations may be economically beneficial for both the host and the
home state and its investors. Moreover, the general exception provision raises similar
concerns to those that have been raised in the framework of the WTO concerning the
interaction between trade and development.73 Considering national preferences and
public policies as exceptions to liberalization minimizes the discretion enjoyed by
national governments to determine and pursue their national development interests.
The EPA adopts the traditional trade approach regarding the relation between foreign
investment and development, granting on the one hand deference to national
governments to determine their public policies, but subjecting them to the scrutiny of
dispute settlement bodies in accordance with overarching international norms.
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D. INVESTMENT PROMOTION AS PART OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
Last but not least, the inclusion of investment promotion provisions in the EPA in
the framework of development cooperation confirms the orientation of the EPA towards
sustainable development. As was aforementioned, the EPA provides for technical and
financial assistance to CARIFORUM States intending to help them improve their
regulatory regimes and enhance their institutional capacity to attract and benefit from
foreign investment. Hence, the EPA addresses the potential lack of financial and human
resources on the part of developing countries, and establishes a firm commitment on the
part of the EC for development aid. The EPA links development cooperation with the
EU instruments of financial and technical assistance,74 such as the European
Development Fund (EDF),75 so that CARIFORUM States can use the instruments of EU
development aid for promoting foreign investment. Besides, the EPA provides a general
framework for cooperation, indicating the priorities and the tools that can be used for
promoting foreign investment in the framework of development cooperation.76
Moreover, the EPA addresses a number of concerns that are raised by the inclusion
of foreign investment promotion provisions in IIAs.77 Firstly, the EPA includes a
mechanism ensuring the effectiveness of development cooperation; the EPA establishes
an institutional framework, namely the EC-CARIFORUM Trade and Development
Committee, which is responsible, among others, for monitoring development
cooperation and making recommendations concerning new cooperation priorities.78
Secondly, the EPA grants the flexibility to host states to determine themselves the
specific investment promotion measures that they deem suitable and necessary. Without
entering into a detailed regulation of the measures that CARIFORUM States should adopt
in order to attract and benefit from foreign investment, such as investment incentives or
specific performance requirements targeted at specific foreign investment activities, the
EPA provides only a general, but sufficient framework for co-operation. Finally, the EPA,
through its direct link with EC development cooperation policy, promotes outward
investment from EU nationals to CARIFORUM States as well. The EDF includes a
specific instrument focused on promotion of foreign investment, the Investment
Facility, which provides venture capital, ordinary loans, guarantees and interest subsidies
for investment projects in ACP countries, financing high quality and productive
infrastructure.79
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
EC IIAs, as exemplified by the EPA, present the attempt by the EU to readdress the
balance between the objectives of international regulation of foreign investment, raising
significant concerns that have been neglected so far by BITs. The EPA illustrates the
effort to introduce in IIAs new provisions and improve existing ones, by taking into
consideration the interests of foreign investors, home and host states and establish a
nuanced balance between divergent interests. The foreign investment regime of the EPA
is based on two, equally important objectives, namely liberalization of foreign
investment conditions and sustainable development. Addressing the demand for
increasing investment flows, the EPA creates a favorable regulatory environment by
liberalizing entry of foreign investment and including commitments concerning
investment promotion. This effort is complemented by a network of provisions which
aim to guarantee the sustainable development orientation and effectiveness of foreign
investment provisions, so as to ensure the maximization of benefits from foreign
investment.
Despite the innovations of the foreign investment regime, the EPA is far from
establishing a complete system of foreign investment rules and remains silent on crucial
aspects of foreign investment regulation that can improve its development potential. The
lack/ambiguity of internal competence obstructs the EU from inserting in its IIAs
provisions on investment protection, which are indispensable for a complete system of
foreign investment rules. Even though the Lisbon Treaty introduces a new competence
on foreign direct investment, it is unclear whether the EU will replace Member States’
BITs with EU IIAs and if so, whether investment protection norms will be subject to
similar “development-friendly” guarantees. Nevertheless, despite all its deficiencies, the
EPA is one of the most significant efforts so far in the field of international foreign
investment regulation to address the aims of promoting foreign investment and balancing
divergent interests, setting a standard for comparison with existing and future agreements.
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